In 1993, Beimel and Chor presented an unconditionally secure interactive protocol which allows a subset of users in a network to establish a common key. This scheme made use of a key predistribution scheme due to Blom.
Introduction
When a subset of users in a network wishes to communicate privately in conference, encryption algorithms can be employed to provide security against eavesdropping. If conventional (private-key) cryptography is used, a common key must be shared by the members of the conference, which we call the privileged subset.
One solution is to use a Key Predistribution Scheme (KPS) in which secret information is given to each user by a trusted authority in such way that speci ed privileged subsets can compute a secret key. One such scheme was described by Blom 3] , in which there is a secret key associated with each pair of users. By giving each user w + 1 pieces of secret information, any of the resulting secret keys is unconditionally secure against a coalition of size w. A generalization of Blom's method can be found in 4], and a survey of key predistribution schemes can be found in 10] .
A di erent approach is to use a Broadcast Encryption Scheme (BES), in which the TA broadcasts an encrypted version of a conference key, whose value can be decrypted only by members of the privileged subset. (Unconditionally secure) broadcast encryption was rst introduced by Fiat and Naor 8] , and has been further studied in 5, 10] .
A third approach is for the members of the privileged set to interactively compute a secret conference key by exchanging messages among themselves. Of course there many such schemes that are computationally secure, going back to the Di e-Hellman scheme. (One nice conference scheme was recently described by Burmester and Desmedt 6] .) Unconditionally secure schemes for conference key agreement have been studied by Beimel and Chor 1, 2] (see also Blundo and Cresti 5] ). We will call such a scheme an Interactive Key Distribution Scheme (IKDS). An IKDS typically consists of a key predistribution phase (which requires a trusted authority), followed by an interactive communication phase among the conference participants (which does not involve the trusted authority).
In this paper, we present new constructions for BES and IKDS. These schemes are onetime schemes in that they can be used for only a single broadcast (in the case of BES) or to establish only one key (in the case of IKDS). Hence, we will use the acronyms OTBES and OTIKDS, respectively. One situation in which this would be very appropriate is if the key that is being established is a (long-term) master key. We should also note, however, that one-time schemes can generally be modi ed in a straightforward way to obtain -time schemes; see 1, 5] , for example.
Our new schemes allow a trade-o between communication and storage. In general, a smaller broadcast size can be accomplished if the participants have more secret information, and vice versa. One of the main purposes of this paper is to examine and quantify these trade-o s.
It should be evident that we are interested in unconditionally secure schemes in this paper, i.e., schemes that do not depend on any computational assumptions. Although these schemes require a trusted authority, they are nevertheless extremely e cient computationally. There is also some bene t in using an unconditionally secure key distribution mechanism, even if the key is to be subsequently used in a conventional, computationally-secure cryptosystem such as DES.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally de ne key predistribution schemes and broadcast encryption schemes in terms of the entropy function. In Section 3 we give a brief description of the key predistribution scheme in 4]. In Section 4 we present two constructions for one-time broadcast encryption schemes. The rst is based on combinatorial structures called resolvable designs; the other is realized using polynomial interpolation.
In Section 5 we prove several lower bounds that quantify the trade-o between the amount of secret information held by the users in a one-time broadcast encryption scheme and the size of the broadcast, and discuss how close our schemes our to meeting these bounds. In Section 6 we present our constructions for one-time interactive key distribution schemes. Finally, in Section 7, we consider the amount of secret information held by the users and the amount of communication in our schemes, as well as deriving lower bounds for these quantities.
2 Mathematical Models
Key Predistribution Schemes
We begin by discussing key predistribution schemes, since we will be using these as building blocks in our consideration of broadcast encryption schemes and interactive key distribution scheme.
Our model is essentially the same as the one in 4]. It consists of a trusted authority (TA) and a set of users U = f1; 2; : : : ; ng. We assume that network is a broadcast channel,
i.e., any information transmitted by the TA (or by a user in the network) will be received by every user. It is assumed to be insecure against passive attacks, i.e., the information that is broadcast can be observed by anyone. However, we will assume that the network is secure against active attacks. (In practice, we could obtain protection against active attacks by using an unconditionally secure authentication code to authenticate all information that is broadcast.) In a key predistribution scheme, the TA generates and distributes secret information to each user. The information given to user i is denoted by u i and must be distributed \o -band" (i.e., not using the network) in a secure manner. For 1 i n, let U i denote the set of all possible secret values that might be distributed to user i by the TA. For any subset of users X U, let U X denote the cartesian product U i 1 : : : U i j , where X = fi 1 ; : : : ; i j g and i 1 < : : : < i j . We assume that there is a probability distribution on U U , and the TA chooses u U 2 U U according to this probability distribution. This secret information will enable various privileged subsets to compute keys.
Let 2 U denote the set of all subsets of users. P 2 U will denote the collection of all privileged subsets to which the TA is distributing keys. F 2 U will denote the collection of all possible coalitions (called forbidden subsets) against which each key is to remain secure.
Once the secret information is distributed, each user i in a privileged set P should be able to compute the key k P associated with P. On the other hand, no forbidden set F 2 F disjoint from P should be able to compute any information about k P .
The desired properties can be described mathematically using the entropy function (see 7] for basic terminology and results on information theory). We say that the scheme is a (P; F)-Key Predistribution Scheme (or (P; F)-KPS) provided the following conditions are satis ed: (KPS1) Each user i in any privileged set P can compute k P : H(K P jU i ) = 0 for all i 2 P, P 2 P. (KPS2) No forbidden subset F disjoint from a privileged subset P has any information on k P : H(K P ) = H(K P jU F ) for all P 2 P and F 2 F such that P \ F = ;.
Usually, we will be considering schemes where P consists of all t-subsets of U, and F consists of all subsets of U of size at most w. Such a KPS will be denoted as a (t; w)-KPS.
Broadcast Encryption Schemes
We now turn to the notion of a one-time broadcast encryption scheme. We describe the model from 10] (a slightly di erent model, which is not a one-time scheme, is presented in 5]). In our model, there is an initial set-up phase in which the TA distributes secret information to the network users, just as in a key predistribution system. As before, we denote the secret information given to user i by u i .
At a later time, the TA will want to broadcast a message (i.e., a plaintext) to a privileged subset P. We will let P 2 U denote the collection of all privileged subsets to which the TA might want to broadcast a message. The particular privileged subset P 2 P to which the TA will broadcast a message is, in general, not known ahead of time.
The message to be broadcast to P will be denoted as m P , and is chosen by the TA from a speci ed set M P according to a speci ed probability distribution on M P . Then the broadcast b P (which is an element of a speci ed set B P ) is computed as a function of m P and u P .
Once b P is broadcast, each user i 2 P should be able to decrypt b P and obtain m P .
On the other hand, we will desire that the broadcast should be secure against speci ed coalitions. F 2 U will denote the collection of all possible forbidden subsets against which a broadcast is to remain secure. We require that no F 2 F disjoint from P should be able to compute any information about m P .
As mentioned above, we discuss the security in terms of a single broadcast, so we call the scheme \one-time". Here is a formal de nition. We say that the scheme is a (P; F)-One-Time Broadcast Encryption Scheme (or (P; F)-OTBES) provided the following conditions are satis ed: (OTBES0) Without knowing the broadcast, no subset of users has any information about m P , even given all the secret information U U :
H(M P jU U ) = H(M P ) for all P 2 P. (OTBES1) The message for a privileged user is uniquely determined by the broadcast and the user's secret information: H(M P jU i B P ) = 0 for all i 2 P; P 2 P. (OTBES2) After receiving the broadcast, no forbidden subset F disjoint from P has any information on m P : H(M P ) = H(M P jU F B P ) for all P 2 P and F 2 F such that P \ F = ;.
As with KPS, we will be considering OTBES where privileged sets have size t and forbidden sets have size (at most) w; the notation (t; w)-OTBES will be used to describe this scenario.
The Blundo et al KPS and its Properties
We will be using the key predistribution scheme of Blom 3] , and the generalization of Blundo et al 4], so we give a brief description of these schemes now. Since the Blundo et al KPS is a generalization of Blom's scheme, we do not need to discuss Blom's scheme explicitly. (When we set t = 2 in the Blundo et al scheme, the Blom scheme is obtained.)
The Blundo et al scheme is a (t; w)-KPS. Let p be a prime such that p n (the number of users). The TA chooses n distinct random numbers s i 2 Z p , and gives s i to user i
(1 i n). These values s i do not need to be secret. Thus, for example, it is su cient to take s i = i for 1 i n. Next, the TA the constructs a random symmetric polynomial in t variables with coecients from Z p , in which the degree of any variable is at most w:
f(x 1 ; : : : ; x t ) = by setting x 1 = s i in f(x 1 ; : : : ; x t ). The coe cients of g i comprise the secret information which is given to user i. The key associated with the t-subset P = fi 1 ; : : : i t g is k P = f(s i 1 ; : : : ; s it ) mod p:
Each user i j 2 P can compute k P = g i j (s i 1 ; : : : ; s i j?1 ; s i j+1 ; : : : ; s it ) mod p: It can be shown that no subset of w users disjoint from P can compute any information about k P (see 4]). Also, it is not hard to see that H(K P ) = log p for all P 2 P, and H(U i ) = t + w ? 1 w ? 1 ! log p for 1 i n.
We will now prove an important property of this scheme, generalizing 1, Lemma 9]. This result is based on the following lemma. Here is the result that we will require later. 
Proof. For 1 i , let A i = (P F)nY i . We have the following:
Hence, the result follows.
The above lemma states that the secret information held by the coalition F reveals no information about the keys held by the`-subsets of P. In fact, in the case of the Blundo et al scheme, we can say a bit more. We have already noted that, in the Blundo et al scheme, each key is equally likely to take on any value in Z p . From this, it will follow in Lemma 3.3 that, given the secret information held by the coalition F, every possible`-tuple of keys held by the`-subsets of P occurs with equal probability p ? . Notice that the following lemma holds for every KPS in which all the keys are uniformly distributed over Z p . V .
We will employ the following famous theorem of Baranyai, a proof of which can be found in 9, Theorem 36.1], for example. Theorem 4.1 (Baranyai's Theorem) The complete k-uniform hypergraph on n points is resolvable if n 0 mod k.
We note that the resolutions of the designs in Theorem 4.1 can be found e ciently.
We are going to construct a (t; w)-OTBES. Suppose that` 1 is an integer such that t 0 mod`. The set-up phase consists of the TA distributing secret information corresponding to a Blundo et al (`; t + w ?`)-KPS implemented over Z p , p prime. For aǹ -subset of users A, we denote by k A the key associated with the subset A.
Before describing the general scheme, we consider the extremal case`= t as a simple example. In this case, there is a key k P associated with each set P of size t. The message to be broadcast to P will be an element m P 2 Z p . The TA encrypts m P using the key k P by de ning b P = k P + m P mod p. Clearly, any user h 2 P can decrypt the broadcast by computing m P = b P ? k P mod p. Note that this particular case does not require the use of 
Security of the Scheme
We now discuss the security of the scheme. It is intuitively clear that a coalition of w users disjoint form a privileged set P has no information about m P after observation of the broadcast, even if they pool all their secret information. This is because of the property, which we proved in Lemma 3.3, that the ? t` keys k A appear to them to be independent random elements of Z p . Each of these keys is used to encrypt one element of Z p , and thus these keys function as a big one-time pad. A formal proof of the security of the scheme can be obtained by a straightforward modi cation of the one given in 2].
A Construction using Polynomial Interpolation
In this section, we describe a variation of the scheme which allows us to remove the congruential condition t 0 mod`. This is accomplished by using polynomial interpolation in place of the resolvable design from Section 4.1. The resulting scheme is a bit more complicated, however.
The set-up phase will be the same as before: the TA distributes secret information corresponding to a Blundo et al (`; t + w ?`)-KPS implemented over Z p , p prime. Now, however, we will require that p ? t` for reasons that will be evident shortly.
As before, there is a key k A the associated with every`-subset of a privileged set P of cardinality t. Each user in P possesses r = ? t?1 ?1 of these R = ? t` keys. Now suppose that the TA wishes to broadcast a message to the privileged set P. Let On the other hand, from the point of view of a coalition of w users, the R = ? t` elements of the broadcast convey no information since the R y-values have all been encrypted by using what appear to be R independent random keys.
Entropy Bounds for OTBES

Lower Bounds on Entropy
We are interested in the amount of secret information held by the users in an OTBES, as well as the size of the broadcast. In general, there exists a trade-o between these quantities: one can achieve a small broadcast if the amount of secret information is large, and vice versa. In this section, we derive several bounds that quantify this trade-o . Our main result (Theorem 5.5) provides a lower bound on the information held by w users together with the broadcast size (in the case t w + 1).
We begin with some preliminary lemmas. 
(we used inequalities (3) and (5) of Appendix A and Property (OTBES1)). Therefore, we obtain H(U i jU F B P ) = H(M P ) + H(U i jU F B P M P )
which proves the lemma.
An immediate consequence of previous lemma is that, in any (P; F)-OTBES, it holds that H(U i ) H(M P ) for any P 2 P and any i 2 P. Setting F = ; and interchanging the role of B P and U i in the previous lemma, we can easily prove the following: Lemma 5.2 In any (P; F)-OTBES, it holds that H(B P jU i ) = H(M P ) + H(B P jU i M P ) for any P 2 P and any i 2 P.
A consequence of property (OTBES0) is the following. Lemma 5.3 In any (P; F)-OTBES it holds that H(M P jU Q ) = H(M P ) for any P 2 P and any Q U. Lemma 5.4 In any (P; F)-OTBES, for any P; Q; R f1; 2; : : : ; ng it holds that H(U Q jU R M P ) = H(U Q jU R ): Proof. Consider the conditional mutual information I(U Q ; M P jU R ). From (6) of Appendix A and Lemma 5.3 we have that H(U Q jU R ) ? H(U Q jU R M P ) = I(U Q ; M P jU R ) = I(M P ; U Q jU R ) = H(M P jU R ) ? H(M P jU Q U R ) = H(M P ) ? H(M P ) = 0; which proves the lemma. Now we proceed to the main result of this section. The following theorem holds for
The Entropy of our Schemes
We measure the e ciency of our constructions by considering the amount of secret information stored by each user as compared to the information content of the broadcast; and the size of the broadcast as compared to its information content.
Hence, we consider the following quantities: r i = H(U i ) H(M) ; 1 i n, and r B P = H(B P ) H(M) :
(Note that these quantities are the reciprocals of information rates as de ned in 10].)
It is easy to see that r i 1 provided that i is a member of at least one privileged set. Also, r B P 1. It is easy to construct schemes in which r i = 1 for 1 i n, and it is also trivial to construct schemes in which r B P = 1 (see 10], for example). However, as mentioned previously, the results of Section 5 show that there is a trade-o between r i and r B P : if one is \small" then the other must be \large". In particular, if we rephrase Theorem 5.5 in terms of the notation de ned above, we have the following result. We look now at the constructions for (t; w)-OTBES that we presented in Sections 4.1 and 4.3. These two constructions are identical from the point of view of the amount of secret information required and the size of the broadcast. So the following analysis applies to both constructions.
Let us consider the case where a message is a random element of (Z p ) r , where r = Of course we are free to choose`however we wish. If we wanted to minimize r i , we would choose`= 1. The resulting (trivial) scheme has r i = 1, which is optimal. If we wanted to minimize r B P , we would choose`= t, yielding r B P = 1, also optimal. But if we wanted to see how close we can get to attaining the bound of Theorem 5.6, we should choose some intermediate value of`.
As an example, suppose we consider the case w = 1. We know from Theorem 5.6 that r i + r B P 3 in any (t; 1) t+2 if t is even. In particular, for t = 2; 3, we get a (t; 1)-OTBES with r i + r B P = 3, which is optimal. For larger t, we always have r i + r B P < 4, which is not too far away from the lower bound r i + r B P 3.
Interactive Key Distribution Schemes
We now turn our attention to one-time interactive key distribution schemes. We will use the model described by Beimel and Chor in 1]. P is the set of privileged subsets and F is the set of forbidden subsets, as before. There is an initial distribution of secret information by the TA, followed by a sequence of messages broadcast by the members of a privileged set P 2 P.
At the end of the protocol, every member of P should be able to compute the same key, m P , while no coalition F 2 F disjoint from P should have any information about m P . A scheme of this type is called a (P; F)-One-Time Interactive Key Distribution Scheme, or (P; F)-OTIKDS. Observe that a (P; F)-OTIKDS should satisfy axioms (OTBES1) and (OTBES2) if we de ne b P to consist of all the messages exchanged during the interactive protocol.
In general, the messages exchanged among the members in P can depend on previous messages, and there may be several rounds of communication. In this paper, we construct schemes of a very special type, termed \non-reactive" by Beimel and Chor. In a nonreactive scheme, every member i 2 P independently chooses a value m i , and uses his or her secret information, u i , to compute an encrypted version of m i , denoted by b i , which is then broadcast. Thus, a non-reactive OTIKDS can be thought of as several independent executions of a one-time broadcast encryption scheme, with each privileged user in turn broadcasting a message that can be decrypted only by the other privileged users.
In a non-reactive OTIKDS, the key m P for the privileged set P consists of the concate- 
Constructions
In this section, we present a non-reactive (t; w)-OTIKDS which uses the (t; w)-OTBES constructed from resolvable designs in Section 4.1. Our construction will contain the BeimelChor scheme as a special case.
Suppose that` 2 is an integer such that t 1 mod (`? 1). The set-up phase consists of the TA distributing secret information corresponding to a Blundo et al (`; t+w ?`)-KPS implemented over (Z p )`, p prime. For an`-subset of users A, we denote by k A the key associated with the subset A. We will think of k A as being made up of`independent keys over Z p , which we will denote by k A;1 ; : : : ; k A;`.
Suppose that the privileged set P wishes to interactively construct a common key. Each user h 2 P will perform the following steps. We should explain the purpose of the values h i;j . Their function is to ensure that every k A;j is used to encrypt exactly one of the m h i 's. The proofs that every privileged user can compute m P and that no forbidden set of w users can compute any information about m P are essentially the same as those used in studying the OTBES scheme in Section 4.1. We now present an example to illustrate the protocol. We observe that our construction reduces to the OTIKDS presented by Beimel and Chor in 1] when we choose`= 2. Also, we can modify the scheme in straightforward manner by using the polynomial interpolation idea of Section 4.3 instead of the resolvable design approach of Section 4.1. This allows us to remove the congruential condition on`, but does not change the amount of secret information or the size of the broadcast.
Entropy Bounds for Key Distribution Schemes
A Lower Bound on Entropy
We de ne the quantities r i and r B P for OTIKDS exactly as we did for OTBES. Beimel and Chor proved a lower bound on r i in 2]. We record this bound as follows. We mentioned already that the Beimel-Chor scheme is the special case`= 2. In this situation, we get r i = 2 + 2(w ? 1) t :
For any values of t and w, it always happens in the Beimel-Chor scheme that r i 2. We observe that by using larger values of`, we can sometimes obtain values of r i very close to Hence our construction is very close to best possible for these values of t (when w = 1).
If t cannot be expressed as t =`2 +`? 1 for some integer`, then we can nd a unique integer`such that`2 ?` t `2 +`:
In this situation, Theorem 7.2 can be used to show that r i < 1 + 2=(`? 1). Summarizing, we obtain the following. In general, given t and w, we might want to know how to choose`so as to minimize r i when applying Theorem 7.2. This can be done as follows. Consider the ratio r i (`) r i (`+ 1) =`2 (t ?`) (`2 ? 1)(t + w ?`) :
As a function of`, r i (`) is decreasing as long as this ratio is at least one. This is equivalent to the condition`2 w +`? (t + w) 0:
The smaller root of this quadratic is negative, and the larger root is = ?1 + p 4w 2 + 4wt + 1 2w : (1) Recalling that` 2 is an integer, we see that the quantity r i is minimized by taking It is also easy to see that 1, with equality occurring if and only if t = 1.
Recall that the case`= 2 corresponds to the Beimel-Chor construction. The optimal choice for`in Theorem 7.2 will be`= 2 whenever 2. This happens if and only if t 3w + 2. In these parameter situations, the ratio between the upper and lower bounds for r i (as obtained in Theorems 7.2 and 7.1) is approximately two. When w = 1, the ratio between the upper and lower bounds approaches one as t increases. However, in other parameter situations, (i.e., t 3w + 3 and w 2), it appears di cult to even compute this ratio. We leave this as an open problem.
